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#decision-making
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Yamamoto & Shiba: When both options share the same payment, people skip right over it — Fukai Reads
A peer-reviewed paper by Shohei Yamamoto (Rikkyo University) and Shotaro Shiba (Toyo University) in Judgment and Decision Making (13 May 2026). Three preregistered experiments (1,400 recruited) show that people largely ignore payments common to both options and decide on the shape of the differing part. With identical totals, re-presenting a choice as an investment or a loan changed patience; with real money, the loan framing's effect held.
Höhs et al.: Reasons for tend to look alike, reasons against scatter — Fukai Reads
A peer-reviewed paper by Höhs, Rebholz and Hütter (University of Tübingen) in Judgment and Decision Making (23 July 2026). Three preregistered experiments (623 participants in total) compared reasons for and against decisions. Reasons for resembled each other and felt more relevant; reasons against were more scattered and felt more novel. In Experiment 3, the more consistent the reasons against looked, the more people moved toward not doing it.
Choi & DeKay: Even with truly random sequences, people judged a repeat about 7 points less likely after a run of four — Fukai Reads
A peer-reviewed paper by Yeonho Choi and Michael L. DeKay (The Ohio State University) in Judgment and Decision Making (29 September 2026). It re-analyzes a 2025 study that claimed the gambler's fallacy disappears in probability judgments when sequences are truly random. Re-aggregated by run length, the fallacy clearly appears: after four balls of the same color, judged chances of a repeat were 7.17 points lower on average. Only 29.0% of individuals, however, showed a credible fallacy on their own.
Engel et al.: When the right path through a maze flips, other people's footprints help people switch faster — Fukai Reads
A peer-reviewed, open-access paper by Christoph Engel, Thomas Holzhausen and Dorothee Mischkowski (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods) in Judgment and Decision Making (21 September 2026). In a preregistered experiment with 288 people, a maze shortcut rule learned over 50 mazes was secretly reversed. Seeing another player's footprints raised the rate of switching by 51.0%, while a paid hint button made no significant difference and was used by only 55.21% of those who had it.
Sears and Weisberg: Readers couldn't spot AI-written stories, and rated them higher when told a human wrote them — Fukai Reads
A paper by Sydney Sears and Deena Skolnick Weisberg on telling AI-written short stories from human ones. Across three studies with over 2,500 participants, readers could not tell them apart (39.39% and 51.97% correct), rated AI stories higher when authorship was hidden, and rated stories higher when told a human wrote them.
Kemmerly et al.: Confident without being right, people bet more and searched more — Fukai Reads
A paper by Rowan Kemmerly and colleagues on unjustified confidence. In a preregistered study of 997 people betting on college football, confidence not backed by accuracy went with bigger bets and more buying of paid information — but was almost unrelated to how much people revised their guesses in light of information.
Nagaya et al.: Delete "don't bet" from the menu, and twice as many people take the risk — Fukai Reads
A peer-reviewed, open-access paper by Kazuhisa Nagaya and Fuminori Ono (Yamaguchi University) and Kazuya Nakayachi (Doshisha University), published in Judgment and Decision Making on 13 July 2026. It re-measures small-stakes loss aversion by rewriting the choice as "bet or bet" instead of "bet or don't bet". Across three studies with 1,345 participants, the share of people picking the risky option jumped from 23.3% to 50.0%. Much of what has been called loss aversion may be a separate habit: a preference for not acting.
Ghasemi et al.: People know what a default does — and aim it differently at allies and rivals — Fukai Reads
A peer-reviewed paper by Omid Ghasemi, Ben R. Newell and colleagues (Judgment and Decision Making, 4 September 2026) pushing back on the well-known 2017 finding that people fail to use defaults strategically. Across three card-game experiments, participants set the default in their own favour on more than 80% of trials — the high-value card for teammates, the low-value card for opponents — and, shown only someone else's default choice, worked out which option was better 79.5% of the time.
McCaughey et al.: People Change How Much Information They Buy Only When They Are Told the Price Changed — Fukai Reads
An open-access, peer-reviewed paper by Linda McCaughey and two co-authors in Judgment and Decision Making. Across five experiments and 755 analyzed participants in a task where every observation costs money, people did change how much information they bought when the price changed — but almost entirely through planning ahead, not through what they experienced while playing. A direct hit for anyone pricing hints or scouting.
Hu et al.: We Judge Others' Satisfaction Without Counting Their Options — Fukai Reads
A peer-reviewed paper by Beidi Hu, Alice Moon and Eric VanEpps in Psychological Science (January 2026). Across six preregistered experiments with 10,092 participants, people factored choice set size into their own satisfaction but barely factored it into predictions of someone else's. Three things shrink the neglect: showing the different set sizes side by side, asking for a ranking, and restating the number of options. It bears directly on how we read playtests and pick rates.
